Recommendations
Cites work
- A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
- Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
- Conventional Contracts
- Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
- Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
- Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
- The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
Cited in
(16)- Evolution, investment, and bargaining
- Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games
- How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters
- The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument
- A dynamic theory of holdup.
- Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
- Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
- Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
- A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
- Evolutionary game theory
- A dynamic game model for a class of venture investment behaviors
- Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
- Holdup and the evolution of bargaining conventions
- Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach
- Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences
- On efficient firm formation
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