Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:700125
DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0891zbMATH Open1021.91005OpenAlexW2160313032MaRDI QIDQ700125FDOQ700125
Authors: Tore Ellingsen, Jack Robles 
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1525.pdf
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
- The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
- Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
- Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
- Conventional Contracts
- Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
- Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
- A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
- Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
- Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
Cited In (16)
- Evolution, investment, and bargaining
- Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games
- How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters
- A dynamic theory of holdup.
- The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument
- Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
- Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
- Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
- Evolutionary game theory
- A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
- A dynamic game model for a class of venture investment behaviors
- Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
- Holdup and the evolution of bargaining conventions
- Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach
- Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences
- On efficient firm formation
This page was built for publication: Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q700125)
