A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00120-0zbMATH Open1059.91010OpenAlexW3123241437MaRDI QIDQ1421899FDOQ1421899

Authors: Rohan Pitchford, Christopher M. Snyder 

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00120-0

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zbMATH Keywords

gamesincomplete contractsContribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
• Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Gradualism and Irreversibility
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
• Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
• Monotone games with positive spillovers

Cited In (14)

• Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river
• Knowledge accumulation within an organization
• The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup
• How to get firms to invest: a simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation.
• Destructing the hold-up
• A dynamic theory of holdup.
• Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower-lender relationship
• A model of seller holdout
• Holdup, search, and inefficiency
• Incremental approaches to establishing trust
• Staged financing with a variable return
• Strategic information exchange
• A dynamic game model for a class of venture investment behaviors
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem

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