A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00120-0MaRDI QIDQ1421899zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rohan Pitchford, Christopher M. Snyder

Publication date 3 February 2004

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00120-0

zbMATH Keywords

gamesincomplete contractsContribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
• A dynamic theory of holdup.
• Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment

Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
• Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Gradualism and Irreversibility
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Monotone games with positive spillovers
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
• Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach

Cited in

(14)

• A dynamic game model for a class of venture investment behaviors
• The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup
• Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river
• Destructing the hold-up
• How to get firms to invest: a simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation.
• Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower-lender relationship
• A dynamic theory of holdup.
• Holdup, search, and inefficiency
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
• Incremental approaches to establishing trust
• Staged financing with a variable return
• Knowledge accumulation within an organization
• Strategic information exchange
• A model of seller holdout

This page was built for publication: A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1421899)