Strategic information exchange

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.010zbMath1282.91046arXiv1007.4427OpenAlexW3122101418MaRDI QIDQ2437831

Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille, Dinah Rosenberg

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1007.4427

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumrepeated gamesfolk theoreminformation externalitiesincomplete information on both sides

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals

Cites Work

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• Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
• A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
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• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Strategic Delay in Bargaining
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Long Cheap Talk
• A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions
• Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
• Stationary multi-choice bandit problems.

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