Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
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Publication:643255
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.001zbMath1255.91040MaRDI QIDQ643255
Johannes Hörner, Stefano Lovo, Tristan Tomala
Publication date: 28 October 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d17/d1739.pdf
Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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