Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
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Publication:643255
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Cites work
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Cited in
(13)- Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games
- Generalized Nash equilibrium with stable belief hierarchies in static games with unawareness
- Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring
- Redefinition of belief distorted Nash equilibria for the environment of dynamic games with probabilistic beliefs
- Strategic information exchange
- Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
- Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
- Repeated games with incomplete information
- Games of incomplete information: a framework based on belief functions
- Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
- Reputation building under uncertain monitoring
- Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences
- Bayesian repeated games and reputation
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