Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6180409
DOI10.3982/TE5351OpenAlexW4388542674MaRDI QIDQ6180409FDOQ6180409
Authors: Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky 
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te5351
Recommendations
repeated gamesincomplete informationsymmetric gameslarge populationsfree-rider problemcommitment typespopulation dominant action
Cites Work
- Non-cooperative games
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Equilibria in symmetric games: theory and applications
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
- Symmetry in \(n\)-player games
- On Repeated Games with Complete Information
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes
- Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
- Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
- Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
- Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets
- Individual learning and cooperation in noisy repeated games
- Pivotal players and the characterization of influence
- Folk theorem in repeated games with private monitoring
- Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
This page was built for publication: Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6180409)
