On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
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We show that any feasible, individually rational payoffs of an infinitely repeated game can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs if the discount factor is close enough to one even if mixed strategies are not observable and public randomizations are not available.
Recommendations
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Cites work
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
- Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
- On Repeated Games with Complete Information
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Cited in
(57)- Repeated games with one-memory
- Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
- Strong equilibria of a repeated game with randomized strategies
- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation
- Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
- Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
- Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
- A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
- Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
- Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames
- Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
- Rationality and bounded information in repeated games, with application to the iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Bargaining power in repeated games
- The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
- Infinitely repeated games of reciprocal players
- Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
- Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?
- A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games
- Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games
- Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games
- Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting
- Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
- A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
- Community enforcement using modal actions
- Myopic perception in repeated games
- Justifiable punishments in repeated games
- Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games
- Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring
- What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
- Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
- Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
- A reputation for honesty
- Bounded memory folk theorem
- Forward-looking principle in repeated games
- How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?
- Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: dispensing with public randomization
- Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
- Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
- The folk theorem for repeated games with time-dependent discounting
- Fractal geometry of equilibrium payoffs in discounted supergames
- Defensive plays in repeated games
- The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Consumption smoothing and discounting in infinite-horizon, discrete-choice problems
- The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring
- Fairly taking turns
- Repeated communication with private lying costs
- Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
- Intertemporal hedging and trade in repeated games with recursive utility
- A folk theorem with unobservable mixtures and endogenous discounting
- Playing repeated games with sublinear randomness
- Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?
- Complexity and repeated implementation
- Using turn taking to mitigate coordination and conflict problems in the repeated battle of the sexes game
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