On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games

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Publication:2640470

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90163-XzbMath0719.90106MaRDI QIDQ2640470

Drew Fudenberg, Eric S. Maskin

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)




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