On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
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Publication:2640470
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90163-XzbMath0719.90106MaRDI QIDQ2640470
Drew Fudenberg, Eric S. Maskin
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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Cites Work
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
- On Repeated Games with Complete Information
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
