Repeated communication with private lying costs

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105668zbMATH Open1520.91074OpenAlexW4372233680MaRDI QIDQ6166489FDOQ6166489

Authors: Harry Di Pei 

Publication date: 6 July 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105668

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zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionpersistent private informationrepeated communication game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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• Repeated communication with private lying costs

Cited In (3)

• Communication with endogenous deception costs
• Repeated communication with private lying costs
• Communication with forgetful liars

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