Repeated communication with private lying costs

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105668MaRDI QIDQ6166489zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Harry Di Pei

Publication date 6 July 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105668

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionpersistent private informationrepeated communication game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Costly miscalibration
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
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• Dynamic sender-receiver games
• Goodwill in communication
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• On the value of repetition for communication games
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
• Repeated communication with private lying costs
• Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Simple bounds on the value of a reputation
• Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic communication with lying costs
• Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility

Cited in

(3)

• Repeated communication with private lying costs
• Communication with endogenous deception costs
• Communication with forgetful liars

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