Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
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Publication:2280048
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Cites work
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Cited in
(10)- Cheating husbands and other stories: A case study of knowledge, action, and communication
- Cheap talk about the detection probability
- Influential news and policy-making
- Repeated communication with private lying costs
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- Designing interrogations
- Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness
- Information design with endogenous state verification
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