Value of public information in sender-receiver games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.10.007MaRDI QIDQ429165zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ying Chen

Publication date 26 June 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkreceiver gamessendervalue of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites work

• A two-person game of information transmission
• Allocation of Decision-making Authority
• Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
• Informal communication
• Information transmission when the informed party is confused
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(16)

• Persuasion and receiver's news
• Public communication with externalities
• On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games
• Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
• Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
• Experimental design to persuade
• Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games
• A note on the value of public information in monopoly
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
• When is the value of public information positive in a game?
• Court‐appointed experts and accuracy in adversarial litigation
• Public disclosure and private information acquisition: a global game approach
• Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
• Cheap talk with two-sided private information
• Speak or wait: strategic delay and the value of public information
• Designing interrogations

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