Allocation of Decision-making Authority
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Publication:3374857
DOI10.1007/S10679-005-2263-ZzbMATH Open1126.91015OpenAlexW3121801887MaRDI QIDQ3374857FDOQ3374857
Authors: Milton Harris, Artur Raviv
Publication date: 23 February 2006
Published in: Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10679-005-2263-z
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