Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
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Publication:2636779
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.001zbMath1281.91040OpenAlexW2109420584MaRDI QIDQ2636779
Publication date: 18 February 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.001
Related Items (12)
A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies ⋮ Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information ⋮ Two-sided strategic information transmission ⋮ Strategic information transmission networks ⋮ Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ Independent versus collective expertise ⋮ Expert panels with selective investigation ⋮ The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games ⋮ Receiver's sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk ⋮ Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders ⋮ Competitive cheap talk
Cites Work
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- Strategic Communication Networks
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Optimal Delegation
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
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