Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.02.001MaRDI QIDQ2636779zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrew McGee, Huanxing Yang

Publication date 18 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.001

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkmultiple senders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites work

• A model of expertise
• Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication
• Allocation of Decision-making Authority
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• How to talk to multiple audiences
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Optimal Delegation
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Strategic communication networks
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic information transmission networks

Cited in

(15)

• A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies
• When are signals complements or substitutes?
• Receiver's sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk
• Two-sided strategic information transmission
• The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games
• Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
• Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information
• Competitive cheap talk
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• Expert panels with selective investigation
• Strategic information transmission networks
• Cheap talk and editorial control
• The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
• Independent versus collective expertise

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