Independent versus collective expertise

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.12.001MaRDI QIDQ6188685zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors

Publication date 11 January 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

reputationcheap talkinformation aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• A model of expertise
• Sequential expert advice: superiority of closed-door meetings
• Professional advice
• Dynamic expert incentives in teams
• On the value of persuasion by experts

Cites work

• A model of expertise
• Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• Competitive cheap talk
• Deliberation and Voting Rules
• Deliberative voting
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Is transparency to no avail?
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Professional advice
• Should straw polls be banned?
• Strategic Information Transmission

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