Independent versus collective expertise

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.12.001zbMATH Open1530.91084MaRDI QIDQ6188685FDOQ6188685

Authors:

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• A model of expertise
• Sequential expert advice: superiority of closed-door meetings
• Professional advice
• Dynamic expert incentives in teams
• On the value of persuasion by experts

zbMATH Keywords

reputationcheap talkinformation aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Competitive cheap talk
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• A model of expertise
• Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Professional advice
• Deliberative voting
• Deliberation and Voting Rules
• Is transparency to no avail?
• Should straw polls be banned?

This page was built for publication: Independent versus collective expertise

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6188685)