Deliberative voting

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.002zbMath1156.91340MaRDI QIDQ2373777

Dino Gerardi, Leeat Yariv

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1723683

zbMATH Keywords

communication; strategic voting; collective choice; juries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

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