Deliberative voting
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Publication:2373777
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.05.002zbMATH Open1156.91340OpenAlexW4249235348MaRDI QIDQ2373777FDOQ2373777
Authors: D. Gerardi, Leeat Yariv 
Publication date: 16 July 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1723683
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Game theory
- An experimental study of collective deliberation
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Information acquisition in committees
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- Universal Mechanisms
- Perfect correlated equilibria
Cited In (33)
- Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
- Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg
- Pivotal persuasion
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- Plea bargaining: on the selection of jury trials
- Information acquisition and transparency in committees
- Voting with limited information and many alternatives
- Pandering and electoral competition
- Lying for votes
- Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games
- A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection
- Deliberation and Voting Rules
- A conversational war of attrition
- A general model of binary opinions updating
- The swing voter's curse in social networks
- On the optimal composition of committees
- Voting with public information
- An experimental study of collective deliberation
- Conservativeness in jury decision-making
- A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
- Independent versus collective expertise
- Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
- A model of deliberation based on Rawls's political liberalism
- Consistency and communication in committees
- Subgroup deliberation and voting
- Should straw polls be banned?
- Information transmission and voting
- Information acquisition in committees
- Communication compatible voting rules
- Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
- Voting on tricky questions
- Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions
- Full information equivalence in large elections
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