Deliberative voting
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Publication:2373777
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Cites work
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- An experimental study of collective deliberation
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Game theory
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information acquisition in committees
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Perfect correlated equilibria
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Universal Mechanisms
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
Cited in
(35)- Pivotal persuasion
- Voting with public information
- Communication compatible voting rules
- A general model of binary opinions updating
- Information transmission and voting
- Voting on tricky questions
- A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
- Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions
- A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection
- The swing voter's curse in social networks
- Should straw polls be banned?
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- Information acquisition in committees
- Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
- Pandering and electoral competition
- Subgroup deliberation and voting
- An experimental study of collective deliberation
- Plea bargaining: on the selection of jury trials
- Information acquisition and transparency in committees
- A conversational war of attrition
- On the optimal composition of committees
- Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
- Deliberation and Voting Rules
- Voting with limited information and many alternatives
- Lying for votes
- Conservativeness in jury decision-making
- Independent versus collective expertise
- A model of deliberation based on Rawls's political liberalism
- Full information equivalence in large elections
- Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games
- Unfounded opinion's curse
- Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds
- Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
- Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg
- Consistency and communication in committees
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