Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games

DOI10.1007/S00182-024-00886-3MaRDI QIDQ6581885zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kohei Kawamura, Vasileios Vlaseros

Publication date 1 August 2024

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00182-024-00886-3

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric equilibriacommittee decision makingprivate informationpublic informationstrategic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games
• Equilibrium agenda formation
• Robust rational turnout
• Information efficiency and majority decisions
• Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

Cites work

• Condorcet meets Ellsberg
• Deliberative voting
• Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules*
• Herding with collective preferences
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem

This page was built for publication: Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6581885)