Equilibrium agenda formation

DOI10.1007/S00355-003-0233-YMaRDI QIDQ1767287zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew O. Jackson, Michel Le Breton

Publication date 8 March 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79772/

zbMATH Keywords

Banks setchaosvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Review text

We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specific settings and show that studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known ``chaos theorems.

Recommendations

• Agenda control in coalition formation
• Equilibrium as compatibility of plans
• Agency equilibrium
• Endogenous agenda formation processes with the one-deviation property
• Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
• Equilibrium selection and consistency
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5200080
• Program equilibrium
• Equitable agendas: Agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054804

Cited in

(17)

• Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
• Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees
• Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games
• Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules
• Inefficiency of equilibria in Doodle polls
• The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
• The discussion of duopoly agenda control under asymmetric information
• Endogenous agenda formation processes with the one-deviation property
• A foundation for strategic agenda voting
• Agendas in legislative decision-making
• Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
• Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
• Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium
• Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games
• Existence of voting-market equilibria
• Endogenous voting agendas
• The Banks set in infinite spaces

This page was built for publication: Equilibrium agenda formation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1767287)