Agency equilibrium

DOI10.3390/G10010014zbMATH Open1443.91066OpenAlexW4232177668MaRDI QIDQ2183990FDOQ2183990

Authors: Jonathan Newton 

Publication date: 27 May 2020

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g10010014

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zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumagencycollectivismindividualism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Equilibrium refinements (91A11) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative games
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Measure theory. Vol. 2. Broad foundations
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
• Recontracting Stability
• A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
• Coalitional stochastic stability
• A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
• Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution
• Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies
• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Coalition-proof equilibrium
• Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
• A note on the incentive compatible core
• Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
• Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core
• Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration

Cited In (6)

• Agency, potential and contagion
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Equilibrium agenda formation
• Social norm and risk attitudes: introduction to the special issue
• Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games
• Negative agency costs

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