Agency equilibrium

DOI10.3390/G10010014MaRDI QIDQ2183990zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jonathan Newton

Publication date 27 May 2020

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g10010014

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumagencycollectivismindividualism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Equilibrium refinements (91A11) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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Cited in

(6)

• Agency, potential and contagion
• Negative agency costs
• Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games
• Equilibrium agenda formation
• Social norm and risk attitudes: introduction to the special issue
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47464 (Why is no real title available?)

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