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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
- Agreeing to disagree
- Common knowledge with probability 1
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Game theory
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations
Cited in
(39)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450029 (Why is no real title available?)
- Common knowledge and quantification
- On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
- On a super large fixed-point of common information in multi-agent signalling games
- Common theories
- Common Knowledge and the Knowledge Account of Assertion
- Common knowledge in email exchanges
- Common knowledge with probability 1
- The probability of nontrivial common knowledge
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4152199 (Why is no real title available?)
- Updating player's knowledge in the conventional model is not straightforward
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795168 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the existence of the ex post symmetric random entry model
- Common knowledge and interactive behaviors: A survey
- Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Common knowledge and limit knowledge
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2222692 (Why is no real title available?)
- Stochastic common learning
- Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information
- Information independence and common knowledge
- Seeing, Knowledge and Common Knowledge
- Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
- Agency equilibrium
- Joint Behavior and Common Belief
- A model of a general parimutuel system: Characterizations and equilibrium selection
- Are the players in an interactive belief model meta-certain of the model itself?
- Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs
- How common are common priors?
- Three views of common knowledge
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4154410 (Why is no real title available?)
- Intersubjective consistency of knowledge and belief
- Decision rules revealing commonly known events
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795169 (Why is no real title available?)
- Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models
- Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
- The fragility of common knowledge
- Common Learning
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