Common belief and common knowledge

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90039-NzbMATH Open0794.90010OpenAlexW2166172407MaRDI QIDQ690342FDOQ690342

Shmuel Zamir, Spyros Vassilakis

Publication date: 31 August 1994

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90039-n

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zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgehierarchies of beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Agreeing to disagree
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations
• Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
• Common knowledge with probability 1

Cited In (26)

• Common knowledge and quantification
• Stochastic common learning
• Seeing, Knowledge and Common Knowledge
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Common knowledge and interactive behaviors: A survey
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information
• The fragility of common knowledge
• On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
• Common Knowledge and the Knowledge Account of Assertion
• Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs
• Updating player's knowledge in the conventional model is not straightforward
• Are the players in an interactive belief model meta-certain of the model itself?
• Intersubjective consistency of knowledge and belief
• Common knowledge with probability 1
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Common Learning
• Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
• A model of a general parimutuel system: Characterizations and equilibrium selection

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