Common belief and common knowledge
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Publication:690342
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90039-NzbMATH Open0794.90010OpenAlexW2166172407MaRDI QIDQ690342FDOQ690342
Authors: Spyros Vassilakis, Shmuel Zamir 
Publication date: 31 August 1994
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90039-n
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Cites Work
- Game theory
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Agreeing to disagree
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations
- Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
- Common knowledge with probability 1
Cited In (39)
- Common knowledge and quantification
- How common are common priors?
- Common knowledge in email exchanges
- On a super large fixed-point of common information in multi-agent signalling games
- Stochastic common learning
- Seeing, Knowledge and Common Knowledge
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Information independence and common knowledge
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Common knowledge and interactive behaviors: A survey
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information
- Three views of common knowledge
- Agency equilibrium
- The fragility of common knowledge
- On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
- Common Knowledge and the Knowledge Account of Assertion
- Joint Behavior and Common Belief
- Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs
- Decision rules revealing commonly known events
- Common theories
- Updating player's knowledge in the conventional model is not straightforward
- Are the players in an interactive belief model meta-certain of the model itself?
- Intersubjective consistency of knowledge and belief
- Common knowledge with probability 1
- The probability of nontrivial common knowledge
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Common Learning
- Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models
- Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
- Common knowledge and limit knowledge
- A model of a general parimutuel system: Characterizations and equilibrium selection
- On the existence of the ex post symmetric random entry model
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