scientific article
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3354677
zbMath0729.90694MaRDI QIDQ3354677
Publication date: 1989
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (36)
Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values ⋮ An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Two-sided matching with interdependent values ⋮ Impact of higher-order uncertainty ⋮ Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions ⋮ Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions ⋮ Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly ⋮ Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information ⋮ Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values ⋮ Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents ⋮ Econometric inference on a large Bayesian game with heterogeneous beliefs ⋮ Price discrimination with robust beliefs ⋮ Efficient assignment with interdependent values ⋮ Perfect implementation ⋮ Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition ⋮ Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty ⋮ Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity ⋮ Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games ⋮ The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism ⋮ Robust implementation in general mechanisms ⋮ Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example ⋮ A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ Incentive compatible market design with applications ⋮ Common belief and common knowledge ⋮ Introduction to computer science and economic theory ⋮ A robustness result for rationalizable implementation ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading ⋮ Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality ⋮ Obvious manipulations ⋮ Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition ⋮ New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting ⋮ Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction ⋮ Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade ⋮ The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements ⋮ Relatively robust decisions
This page was built for publication:
