scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454
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Publication:3354677
zbMATH Open0729.90694MaRDI QIDQ3354677FDOQ3354677
Publication date: 1989
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cited In (39)
- Common belief and common knowledge
- A robustness result for rationalizable implementation
- The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
- Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity
- Relatively robust decisions
- Introduction to computer science and economic theory
- On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Ex post implementation
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
- Incentive compatible market design with applications
- Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
- Impact of higher-order uncertainty
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
- A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
- Econometric inference on a large Bayesian game with heterogeneous beliefs
- Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
- Perfect implementation
- Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
- Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games
- Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty
- Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
- Are the players in an interactive belief model meta-certain of the model itself?
- Obvious manipulations
- Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example
- Price discrimination with robust beliefs
- Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly
- New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting
- Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition
- Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition
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