Efficient assignment with interdependent values

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.03.008MaRDI QIDQ896937zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Fuhito Kojima

Publication date 15 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.008

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent valuesex-post implementationBayesian implementationapproximate ex-post implementationefficient assignmenthouse allocation problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Robust Mechanism Design
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• When are local incentive constraints sufficient?

Cited in

(14)

• Market Design
• Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
• An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
• The marriage problem with interdependent preferences
• Incentive compatibility with interdependent preferences
• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
• Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
• Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values
• On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
• The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
• On finding and detecting efficient assignments in the case of multiple inputs and outputs
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets

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