Efficient assignment with interdependent values

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.03.008zbMATH Open1330.91149OpenAlexW1990227282MaRDI QIDQ896937FDOQ896937

Authors: Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Fuhito Kojima

Publication date: 15 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.008

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

Social choice and individual values
Title not available (Why is that?)
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
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Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
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Robust Mechanism Design
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The Limits of ex post Implementation
Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
Two-sided matching with interdependent values
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An Efficient Auction
Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result
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Group stability in matching with interdependent values
Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies

Cited In (11)

Market Design
Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences
An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
On finding and detecting efficient assignments in the case of multiple inputs and outputs

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