Efficient assignment with interdependent values
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Publication:896937
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.008zbMath1330.91149OpenAlexW1990227282MaRDI QIDQ896937
Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Fuhito Kojima
Publication date: 15 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.008
interdependent valuesex-post implementationBayesian implementationapproximate ex-post implementationefficient assignmenthouse allocation problem
Related Items (8)
The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ The limits of ex post implementation without transfers ⋮ Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations ⋮ Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values ⋮ The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
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