Group stability in matching with interdependent values
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Publication:490943
DOI10.1007/S10058-014-0156-3zbMATH Open1329.91101OpenAlexW2120438552MaRDI QIDQ490943FDOQ490943
Authors: Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna, Michael Ostrovsky 
Publication date: 21 August 2015
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0156-3
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Cites Work
- Game theory
- Robust stability in matching markets
- The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
- Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill?Biased Technology
- Group robust stability in matching markets
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- Incomplete information, credibility and the core
- Posterior efficiency
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design
- Matching with noise and the acceptance curse
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets
- The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
Cited In (9)
- Market Design
- Group robust stability in matching markets
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners
- Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
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