Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
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Publication:1867762
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00073-3zbMath1033.91029OpenAlexW2160038824MaRDI QIDQ1867762
Rajiv Vohra, Enrico Minelli, Françoise Forges
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00073-3
Related Items (37)
Information transmission in coalitional voting games ⋮ Core and equilibria in coalitional asymmetric information economies ⋮ Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies ⋮ Cooperative game with nondeterministic returns ⋮ A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information ⋮ Agency equilibrium ⋮ The incentive compatible coarse core when information is almost complete. ⋮ Signaling, screening, and core stability ⋮ Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies ⋮ Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core ⋮ Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies ⋮ Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments ⋮ The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty ⋮ The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information ⋮ Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information. ⋮ The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game. ⋮ Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values ⋮ Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information ⋮ Group stability in matching with interdependent values ⋮ Stability with one-sided incomplete information ⋮ Incentive efficient risk sharing in a settlement mechanism ⋮ Some new characterization of rational expectation equilibria in economies with asymmetric information ⋮ The weak sequential core for two-period economies ⋮ On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments ⋮ Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values ⋮ Market games with asymmetric information: the core ⋮ The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information ⋮ Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery ⋮ Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies ⋮ COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS ⋮ Incomplete information, credibility and the core ⋮ Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information ⋮ Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example ⋮ Blocking coalitions and fairness in asset markets and asymmetric information economies ⋮ An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information ⋮ The anonymous core of an exchange economy. ⋮ Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries
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