Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete

DOI10.1007/PL00004194MaRDI QIDQ5953040zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefan Krasa, Wayne J. Shafer

Publication date 14 January 2002

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004194

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationcoredifferential informationeconomy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44)

Review text

The authors study the properties of cores with differential information when the economies converge to complete information. In this context are investigated the private core where agents' net trades are measurable with respect to agents' private information and the incentive compatible core in which the coalitions of agents are restricted to incentive compatible allocations. Thus, the private core exists, it takes informational asymmetries into account, being incentive compatible. The main result for the private core remains also valid for the coarse core.

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Cited in

(13)

• Bounded rational learning in differential information economies: Core and value
• The incentive compatible coarse core when information is almost complete.
• Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
• Core convergence with asymmetric information
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Core concepts for incomplete market economies
• Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
• Continuity properties of the private core
• Core and equilibrium in incomplete markets
• Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete
• Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: The core
• Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies
• Private information: Similarity as compatibility

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