Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001zbMath1271.91081OpenAlexW2054483576MaRDI QIDQ2460834

Yeneng Sun, Nicholas C. Yannelis

Publication date: 16 November 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcorePareto efficiencyincentive compatibilityWalrasian allocationnegligible private information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (11)

Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge ⋮ The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ Core and equilibria in coalitional asymmetric information economies ⋮ Conditional exact law of large numbers and asymmetric information economies with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ Equilibria and incentives in private information economies ⋮ Equilibrium theory under ambiguity ⋮ Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies ⋮ Theorems on the core of an economy with infinitely many commodities and consumers ⋮ Existence of Edgeworth equilibria for economies with asymmetric information ⋮ Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications ⋮ Perfect and proper equilibria in large games

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