Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1416504
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00185-4zbMath1064.91055OpenAlexW3125322441MaRDI QIDQ1416504
Andrew Postlewaite, Richard P. McLean
Publication date: 14 December 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00185-4
Related Items (7)
The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies ⋮ Core convergence with asymmetric information ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces ⋮ Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
Cites Work
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
This page was built for publication: Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty.
