Perfect and proper equilibria in large games
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Publication:2291177
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.005zbMath1431.91013OpenAlexW2990413469WikidataQ126641241 ScholiaQ126641241MaRDI QIDQ2291177
Publication date: 30 January 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.005
Related Items (2)
Robust perfect equilibrium in large games ⋮ Conditional expectation of Banach valued correspondences and economic applications
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