Perfect and proper equilibria of large games
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Publication:1384022
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0581zbMath0895.90189MaRDI QIDQ1384022
Publication date: 13 April 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0581
91A07: Games with infinitely many players
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