Some refinements of Nash equilibria of large games
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Publication:1329909
DOI10.1006/GAME.1994.1038zbMATH Open0854.90149OpenAlexW2002166239MaRDI QIDQ1329909FDOQ1329909
Authors: Kali P. Rath 
Publication date: 9 August 1994
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1038
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Nash equilibriumperfect equilibriumproper equilibriumcontinuum of playerspersistent equilibriumfinite actionslarge game
Cited In (18)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Approximation and characterization of Nash equilibria of large games
- Persistent equilibria in strategic games
- Equilibria in large games with continuous procedures.
- Robust perfect equilibrium in large games
- Rationalizability and mixed strategies in large games
- Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games
- An early paper on the refinement of Nash equilibrium
- Large games with only small players and finite strategy sets
- Nash equilibria in large games
- On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization
- Pareto refinements of pure-strategy equilibria in games with public and private information
- Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium
- Large Supports are required for Well-Supported Nash Equilibria
- Perfect and proper equilibria of large games
- Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
- Perfect and proper equilibria in large games
- A correction to ``Large games and the law of large numbers
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