Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
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Publication:4585985
DOI10.3982/TE1178zbMATH Open1395.91041OpenAlexW1483388634MaRDI QIDQ4585985FDOQ4585985
Authors: Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Richard McLean 
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1178
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