scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1944155
The paper deals with the model of an \(n\)-person non-cooperative multistage game. The particular repetitions of the game, represented by one-stage games with the same set of players but generally different sets of strategies and payoffs, form a tree with transition function reflecting the outcomes of the previous games. The attention is focused on both, finite and infinite, graph trees of the game. In both cases, the main results regard the existence of the Nash Equilibrium (in the infinite case the Strong Nash Equilibrium) and its properties. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0990.00035].
- Nash refinements of equilibria
- Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
- Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
- Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
- Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
- New classes of Nash solutions in multistage games
- Approximate Nash Equilibria for Multi-player Games
- On Nash equilibrium in repeated hierarchical games
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- Nash equilibria in perturbation-stable games
- Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games
- Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated \(N\)-person games.
- An early paper on the refinement of Nash equilibrium
- Construction of Nash equilibrium based on multiple stopping problem in multi-person game
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- Multistage games
- New classes of Nash solutions in multistage games
- STRONG NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MULTISTAGE GAMES
- On Nash equilibrium in repeated hierarchical games
- Multistage Situations
- On the 85th anniversary of L. A. Petrosyan
This page was built for publication:
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4407464)
