Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
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Publication:2641232
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90058-RzbMath0721.90090OpenAlexW2145378960MaRDI QIDQ2641232
Eric S. Maskin, Drew Fudenberg
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90058-r
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Cites Work
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
