Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
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The ``perfect Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games establishes that the sets of Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs are equal in the limit as the discount factor \(\delta\) tends to one. We provide conditions under which the two sets coincide before the limit is reached. That is, we show how to compute \({\underline \delta}\) such that the Nash and perfect equilibrium payoffs of the \(\delta\)-discounted game are identical for all \(\delta >{\underline \delta}\).
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Cites work
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Cited in
(36)- Equilibrium and perfection in discounted supergames
- A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games
- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- The strength of a little perfection
- Strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibria in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and discounting
- Bounded rationality, neural network and folk theorem in repeated games with discounting
- On the selection of one feedback Nash equilibrium in discounted linear-quadratic games
- The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups
- Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
- Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
- Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with different learners
- Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking
- Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
- Lotka-Volterra equation and replicator dynamics: New issues in classification
- Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
- Evolution of repeated prisoner's dilemma play under logit dynamics
- Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games
- The emergence of cooperation through leadership
- Endogenous neighborhood selection and the attainment of cooperation in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
- The rise of cooperation in correlated matching prisoners dilemma: An experiment
- How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?
- Perfect Nash equilibria in finite repeated game and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the constituent game
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1944155 (Why is no real title available?)
- Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
- Game theory and strategic complexity
- Quality distortions in vertical relations
- The effect of noise and average relatedness between players in iterated games
- Subgame-perfect attainment of minimax punishments in discounted two-person games
- When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
- A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting
- A dynamic Cournot-Nash game: a representation of a finitely repeated feedback game
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