Endogenous neighborhood selection and the attainment of cooperation in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game

DOI10.1007/S10614-009-9184-4zbMath1198.91027OpenAlexW1989055107MaRDI QIDQ2268984

Troy Tassier, Jason Barr

Publication date: 15 March 2010

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-009-9184-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Effect of the migration mechanism based on risk preference on the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Effect of migration based on strategy and cost on the evolution of cooperation

Cites Work

• Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.
• EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN A SPATIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA

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