Endogenous neighborhood selection and the attainment of cooperation in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game

DOI10.1007/S10614-009-9184-4zbMATH Open1198.91027OpenAlexW1989055107MaRDI QIDQ2268984FDOQ2268984

Authors: Jason Barr, Troy Tassier 

Publication date: 15 March 2010

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-009-9184-4

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

• The evolution of cooperation
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks
• Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.
• EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN A SPATIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA
• Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games

Cited In (3)

• Effect of migration based on strategy and cost on the evolution of cooperation
• Effect of the migration mechanism based on risk preference on the evolution of cooperation
• Effects of neighbourhood size and connectivity on the spatial continuous prisoner's dilemma

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