The strength of a little perfection

DOI10.1007/BF01271130zbMath0762.90099MaRDI QIDQ1189667

S. Singh

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

complexity; perfection; equilibria of repeated games; measure of partial subgame perfection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Finite automata equilibria with discounting, Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity, Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games, Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata, Little perfection and complexity

Cites Work

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