The strength of a little perfection

DOI10.1007/BF01271130zbMath0762.90099OpenAlexW1984079907MaRDI QIDQ1189667

S. Singh

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01271130

zbMATH Keywords

complexityperfectionequilibria of repeated gamesmeasure of partial subgame perfection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (13)

Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome ⋮ Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique ⋮ Complexity and repeated implementation ⋮ Trimmed equilibrium ⋮ Learning with bounded memory in games ⋮ Finite automata equilibria with discounting ⋮ Game Theory and Strategic Complexity ⋮ Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity ⋮ Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games ⋮ Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory ⋮ Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata ⋮ Little perfection and complexity ⋮ Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The chain store paradox
• Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria
• Sequential Equilibria
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

This page was built for publication: The strength of a little perfection