Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1876641
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.003zbMath1086.91014OpenAlexW1992188271MaRDI QIDQ1876641
Publication date: 20 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.003
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (12)
Bilateral bargaining in networks ⋮ Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the ``law of one price ⋮ Complexity and repeated implementation ⋮ Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium ⋮ Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games ⋮ Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result ⋮ The price of flexibility: towards a theory of thinking aversion ⋮ Adaptation and complexity in repeated games ⋮ Game Theory and Strategic Complexity ⋮ Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games ⋮ Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs ⋮ Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Finite automata play a repeated extensive game
- Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets
- On players with a bounded number of states
- The strength of a little perfection
- Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
- Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
- Little perfection and complexity
- Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games
- Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence
- Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
- Security Equilibrium
- Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium
- Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
This page was built for publication: Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome
