Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome (Q1876641)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2093740
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| English | Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2093740 |
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Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome (English)
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20 August 2004
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The paper investigates the effect of introducing complexity costs of implementing strategies into the dynamic matching and bargaining games. More specifically, it shows that complexity considerations can provide a game-theoretic foundation for the competitive behaviour in decentralised markets with a finite number of agents. Moreover, it shows that in these models, the introduction of complexity costs into players' preferences ensures that in equilibrium, players choose history-independent strategies, sometimes referred to as stationary or Markov strategies.
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bargaining games
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matching games
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complexity costs
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0.8366847634315491
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0.7920059561729431
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0.7565085887908936
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0.7543370127677917
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0.7538294196128845
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