Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.014zbMath1186.91110MaRDI QIDQ996376

Hamid Sabourian, Jihong Lee

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.014

zbMATH Keywords

complexity; efficiency; bargaining; bounded rationality; transaction cost; repeated game; Coase theorem; automaton

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68Q25: Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Game Theory and Strategic Complexity, Computing equilibria in discounted dynamic games, Complexity and repeated implementation, Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games

Cites Work

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