Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.007zbMath1284.91043OpenAlexW2049359857MaRDI QIDQ2437166

Nozomu Muto

Publication date: 3 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/16940/070econDP06-07.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

finite automatonrepeated gameprisoner's dilemmastrategic complexityextensive gamemultiple complexity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games

Cites Work

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