Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games
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Publication:2437166
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3777289 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome
- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs
- Complexity and Competition
- Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
- Finite automata equilibria with discounting
- Finite automata play a repeated extensive game
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
- Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
Cited in
(11)- The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies
- Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
- Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games
- On complexity as bounded rationality (extended abstract)
- Strategic entropy and complexity in repeated games
- Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games
- Little perfection and complexity
- Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games
- In defense of DEFECT.
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- Determinancy with Complicated Strategies
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