Finite automata play a repeated extensive game

DOI10.1006/JETH.1993.1063zbMATH Open0779.90081OpenAlexW1600141987MaRDI QIDQ688907FDOQ688907

Authors Michele Piccione, Ariel Rubinstein

Publication date 1 November 1993

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1063

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely repeated extensive game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Formal languages and automata (68Q45) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cited in

(23)

• Automata and compositional strategies in extensive form games
• Repeated games with finite automata
• Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
• Behavior of finite and infinite automata in game situations
• Invertibility of higher order \(k\)-valued logical control networks and its application in trajectory control
• Cooperation and computability in \(n\)-player games
• Bounded computational capacity equilibrium
• Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome
• Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium
• Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games
• Finitely repeated games with finite automata
• Gurevich-Harrington's games defined by finite automata
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Game theory and strategic complexity
• Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
• Computing equilibria in discounted dynamic games
• Forecasting errors and bounded rationality: An example
• Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata
• Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria
• The price of flexibility: towards a theory of thinking aversion
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035147 (Why is no real title available?)
• Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs
• Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs

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