Finite automata play a repeated extensive game

DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1063zbMath0779.90081OpenAlexW1600141987MaRDI QIDQ688907

Ariel Rubinstein, Michele Piccione

Publication date: 1 November 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1063

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely repeated extensive game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) 2-person games (91A05) Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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