Forecasting errors and bounded rationality: An example

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00014-6zbMath0930.91008WikidataQ128089467 ScholiaQ128089467MaRDI QIDQ1296456

Luca Anderlini

Publication date: 2 August 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitycomputabilityaxiomatic complexity measurescomplexity cost measuredeterministic, infinite price sequenceforecasting errors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

• Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma
• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Finite automata play a repeated extensive game
• Some notes on Church's thesis and the theory of games
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Finite automata equilibria with discounting
• On computable beliefs of rational machines
• Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
• Communication, computability, and common interest games
• Learning Rational Expectations Under Computability Constraints
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium
• Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature
• Cooperation and Effective Computability
• A Machine-Independent Theory of the Complexity of Recursive Functions
• Cooperation and computability in \(n\)-player games
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