The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
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Publication:3815895
DOI10.2307/1913097zbMath0664.90103OpenAlexW1994789681WikidataQ99541066 ScholiaQ99541066MaRDI QIDQ3815895
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913097
Nash equilibriumfinite automatastrategic complexitycomplexity of the strategiesMoore-machinestwo-person infinitely repeated games
Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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