Communication, computability, and common interest games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1294100
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0652zbMath0926.91001OpenAlexW2101022853MaRDI QIDQ1294100
Publication date: 11 November 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/c8788aac4aaa5e9d6f85cb64e067cca0b04c186b
equilibrium selectioncomputabilitypreplay communicationcommon interest gamesone-shot two-player finite actionstrategic form common interest games
Related Items
Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs, The give and take game: analysis of a resource sharing game, Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental stag-hunt games, Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata, Introduction to computer science and economic theory, Cooperation and computability in \(n\)-player games, Coordination need not be a problem, Communication, computability, and common interest games, Forecasting errors and bounded rationality: An example, Team reasoning and the rational choice of payoff-dominant outcomes in games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma
- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- Some notes on Church's thesis and the theory of games
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- On computable beliefs of rational machines
- Average behavior in learning models
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Communication, computability, and common interest games
- Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
- Learning Rational Expectations Under Computability Constraints
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
- Cooperation and Effective Computability
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
