Average behavior in learning models

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90045-JzbMATH Open0760.90101OpenAlexW2147614686MaRDI QIDQ1201147FDOQ1201147

Authors: David Canning 

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90045-j

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zbMATH Keywords

overlapping generationsadaptive behavior modelslearning in games with bounded memory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Cites Work

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• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Markov processes and learning models
• Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification
• The Theory of Classical Dynamics
• Invariant Distributions and the Limiting Behavior of Markovian Economic Models
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Cited In (15)

• Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
• Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment
• The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
• Learning from others: conditioning versus averaging
• Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
• Network formation and social coordination
• Evolutionary learning in signalling games
• How noise matters.
• Responsive and strong responsive evolutionary dynamics
• Multi-level evolution in population games
• Learning, matching, and aggregation
• Communication, computability, and common interest games
• Learning and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) games. Some simulation results
• Learning by mirror averaging
• A note on pre-play communication

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