Average behavior in learning models

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90045-JzbMath0760.90101OpenAlexW2147614686MaRDI QIDQ1201147

David Canning

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90045-j

zbMATH Keywords

overlapping generationsadaptive behavior modelslearning in games with bounded memory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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