Average behavior in learning models

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90045-JMaRDI QIDQ1201147zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Canning

Publication date 17 January 1993

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90045-j

zbMATH Keywords

adaptive behavior modelslearning in games with bounded memoryoverlapping generations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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Cites work

• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Invariant Distributions and the Limiting Behavior of Markovian Economic Models
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Markov processes and learning models
• Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• The Theory of Classical Dynamics

Cited in

(15)

• Learning and equilibrium selection in 2 2 games. Some simulation results
• The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
• Learning, matching, and aggregation
• Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
• Communication, computability, and common interest games
• Responsive and strong responsive evolutionary dynamics
• Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
• How noise matters.
• Network formation and social coordination
• Multi-level evolution in population games
• A note on pre-play communication
• Evolutionary learning in signalling games
• Learning from others: conditioning versus averaging
• Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment
• Learning by mirror averaging

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