Evolutionary learning in signalling games

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0795zbMath1013.91027OpenAlexW2130150918MaRDI QIDQ5928235

Hans Jørgen Jacobson, Mogens H. Jensen, Brigitte Sloth

Publication date: 6 July 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/94890e5d0439c0d4377a784b19500f4f4bc62aba

zbMATH Keywords

learningequilibrium selectionsignalling gamesstochastic trembles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (4)

Equilibrium vengeance ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection. ⋮ The dynamics of costly signaling

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Average behavior in learning models
• A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

This page was built for publication: Evolutionary learning in signalling games