The dynamics of costly signaling
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Publication:2351218
DOI10.3390/g4020163zbMath1314.91047OpenAlexW2122809002MaRDI QIDQ2351218
Publication date: 23 June 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g4020163
Related Items (5)
Honesty through repeated interactions ⋮ The robustness of hybrid equilibria in costly signaling games ⋮ David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning ⋮ Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game ⋮ Ambiguous signals, partial beliefs, and propositional content
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- Evolutionary learning in signalling games
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