The dynamics of costly signaling

DOI10.3390/g4020163zbMath1314.91047OpenAlexW2122809002MaRDI QIDQ2351218

Elliott O. Wagner

Publication date: 23 June 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g4020163

zbMATH Keywords

game theorysignalingevolutionary dynamicscostly signaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

Honesty through repeated interactions ⋮ The robustness of hybrid equilibria in costly signaling games ⋮ David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning ⋮ Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game ⋮ Ambiguous signals, partial beliefs, and propositional content

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• Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equations
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Social Stability and Equilibrium
• Informational Equilibrium
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Evolutionary learning in signalling games

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