The robustness of hybrid equilibria in costly signaling games

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0159-XMaRDI QIDQ338217zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Simon M. Huttegger, Kevin J. S. Zollman

Publication date 4 November 2016

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0159-x

zbMATH Keywords

structural stabilityreplicator dynamicscostly signaling gameshybrid equilibriumselection-mutation dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals
• Selection-mutation dynamics of signaling games
• The dynamics of costly signaling
• Feasibility of communication in binary signaling games
• Some dynamics of signaling games

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1455131 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Feasibility of communication in binary signaling games
• Nonlinear oscillations, dynamical systems, and bifurcations of vector fields
• Selection-mutation dynamics of signaling games
• The dynamics of costly signaling
• The selection mutation equation

Cited in

(3)

• Selection-mutation dynamics of signaling games
• Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes
• The dynamics of costly signaling

This page was built for publication: The robustness of hybrid equilibria in costly signaling games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q338217)