The robustness of hybrid equilibria in costly signaling games

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0159-XzbMATH Open1348.91066OpenAlexW634985790MaRDI QIDQ338217FDOQ338217

Authors: Simon M. Huttegger, Kevin J. S. Zollman 

Publication date: 4 November 2016

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0159-x

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zbMATH Keywords

structural stabilityreplicator dynamicscostly signaling gameshybrid equilibriumselection-mutation dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Nonlinear oscillations, dynamical systems, and bifurcations of vector fields
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The dynamics of costly signaling
• Feasibility of communication in binary signaling games
• The selection mutation equation
• Selection-mutation dynamics of signaling games

Cited In (3)

• Selection-mutation dynamics of signaling games
• Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes
• The dynamics of costly signaling

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