Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.02.039zbMath1398.91100WikidataQ81064687 ScholiaQ81064687MaRDI QIDQ1794909

Gerhard Jäger

Publication date: 16 October 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.02.039

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stability; signaling games; neutral stability; evolutionary game theory; costly signaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

92D15: Problems related to evolution

91A05: 2-person games

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

Learning with neighbours, Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests, Neutral stability, drift, and the diversification of languages, Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: Signaling systems vs. partial pooling, The dynamics of costly signaling, Signaling Games

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