Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1312240
DOI10.1006/game.1993.1030zbMath0802.90127OpenAlexW1992687343MaRDI QIDQ1312240
Publication date: 31 January 1994
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1030
Related Items (32)
Lotka-Volterra equation and replicator dynamics: New issues in classification ⋮ Inventing new signals ⋮ Evolutionary stability of ambiguity in context signaling games ⋮ Universalization and altruism ⋮ Some dynamics of signaling games ⋮ The evolution of compositionality in signaling games ⋮ Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values ⋮ Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests ⋮ Probe and adjust in information transfer games ⋮ The evolution of functionally referential meaning in a structured world ⋮ Voronoi languages: equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals ⋮ Finite populations choose an optimal language ⋮ Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system ⋮ Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games. ⋮ Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk ⋮ A note on pre-play communication ⋮ Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory ⋮ Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining ⋮ Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers ⋮ Informal communication ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: Signaling systems vs. partial pooling ⋮ Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ Neutral stability, drift, and the diversification of languages ⋮ Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals ⋮ The evolution of type communication in a sender/receiver game of common interest with cheap talk ⋮ The role of forgetting in the evolution and learning of language ⋮ Communication, computability, and common interest games ⋮ Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games ⋮ Economists' models of learning ⋮ The evolution of ambiguity in sender -- receiver signaling games ⋮ Coordination and learning with a partial language ⋮ Selection-mutation dynamics of signaling games
This page was built for publication: Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
