Inventing new signals
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Publication:367480
DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0027-2zbMATH Open1300.91022OpenAlexW2084987844MaRDI QIDQ367480FDOQ367480
Authors: Jason McKenzie Alexander, Brian Skyrms, Sandy L. Zabell
Publication date: 16 September 2013
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0027-2
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