Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.009zbMath1134.91343OpenAlexW2087264963MaRDI QIDQ926892

Christina Pawlowitsch

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.009

zbMATH Keywords

Lyapunov stabilityreplicator dynamicsneutral stabilitylanguage evolutionsender-receiver gamesuboptimality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (21)

Dynamics in atomic signaling games ⋮ Inventing new signals ⋮ Evolutionary stability of ambiguity in context signaling games ⋮ Some dynamics of signaling games ⋮ The evolution of compositionality in signaling games ⋮ Compositional signaling in a complex world ⋮ The evolution of vagueness ⋮ Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests ⋮ Probe and adjust in information transfer games ⋮ David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning ⋮ A tree formulation for signaling games ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: Signaling systems vs. partial pooling ⋮ Neutral stability, drift, and the diversification of languages ⋮ Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals ⋮ One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations ⋮ Feasibility of communication in binary signaling games ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ On salience and signaling in sender-receiver games: partial pooling, learning, and focal points ⋮ The role of forgetting in the evolution and learning of language ⋮ The evolution of ambiguity in sender -- receiver signaling games ⋮ Selection-mutation dynamics of signaling games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Optimizing the mutual intelligibility of linguistic agents in a shared world
• On evolutionarily stable sets
• Selfregulation of behaviour in animal societies. II. Games between two populations without selfinteraction
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
• Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game
• Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability?
• Regularity versus Degeneracy in Dynamics, Games, and Optimization: A Unified Approach to Different Aspects
• Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

This page was built for publication: Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system