Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.009zbMath1134.91343MaRDI QIDQ926892

Christina Pawlowitsch

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.009

zbMATH Keywords

Lyapunov stability; replicator dynamics; neutral stability; language evolution; sender-receiver game; suboptimality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

Related Items

Dynamics in atomic signaling games, Inventing new signals, A tree formulation for signaling games, The evolution of vagueness, Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests, Probe and adjust in information transfer games, The evolution of compositionality in signaling games, Compositional signaling in a complex world, David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning, Neutral stability, drift, and the diversification of languages, Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals, One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations, Feasibility of communication in binary signaling games, On salience and signaling in sender-receiver games: partial pooling, learning, and focal points, The evolution of ambiguity in sender -- receiver signaling games, Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: Signaling systems vs. partial pooling, Selection-mutation dynamics of signaling games, Some dynamics of signaling games, Signaling Games, The role of forgetting in the evolution and learning of language

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