Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests
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Publication:907901
DOI10.1007/s10670-013-9465-0zbMath1329.91021OpenAlexW2138087154MaRDI QIDQ907901
Robert van Rooij, Kris De Jaegher
Publication date: 27 January 2016
Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/231623
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