Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
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Publication:1176679
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90122-KzbMath0739.90078OpenAlexW2102906247MaRDI QIDQ1176679
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90122-k
cheap talkcyclically stable setnoncooperative game with common interestPareto optimal outcomesocial stability
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Cites Work
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- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Communication between rational agents
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Information leakage forces cooperation
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Non-cooperative games
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- Sequential Equilibria
- The Logic of Animal Conflict
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